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THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESY:
DUE PROCESS, THE MEDIA, AND THEIR CRITICS
Lawrence W. Kessler*
The public must be made aware of the practicalities of law enforcement. They must be made to understand that law enforcement officers cannot offer the required protection demanded of
them from within the straight-jacket placed upon them by present
day court ...

restrictions."

Those engaged in this campaign to make the public aware can
be thought of as law enforcement activists. The activists are an
2
amorphous group. They have drawn support from presidents,
presidential candidates3 United States senators 4 judges,5 and
most vociferously from police chiefs and prosecuting attorneys.6
*B.A., J.D., Columbia University. Associate Professor of Law, University of
Cincinnati.
1 Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J.
CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 85, 89 (1962).
2 President Eisenhower, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1967, at 20, col. 8.
3 "[The nation's] judicial and legal system [must share in the blame for] the shocking crime and disorder...." Mr. Nixon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 31, col. 1. Of
course, Mr. Nixon's standard campaign speech included the lines "some of our courts
and their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the
criminal forces in this country." N.Y. Times, March 11, 1968, at 33, col. 6. See also
Governor Ronald Reagan, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1968, at 29, col. 3.
4 [Miranda benefited the lawbreaker and, if it is not overturned, he] will be further
encouraged and reassured that he can continue a life of crime ... with impunity ....
Senator John L. McClellan, 114 CONG. Rc. 14, 148 (1968). See also James L. Buckley,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1968, at 28, col. 8.
5 [Slomething must be done to curb the irresponsible decisions coming down from
the Supreme Court . . ., decisions which are crippling the police in their duty to
prevent crime, to detect criminals, and to prosecute those who have declared war
on society. The Supreme Court . . . has . . . impeded the police in the faithful
discharge of their duties.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Michael Musmanno, The Supreme Court and
Crime, 34 VITAL SPEECHEs 666, 667 (1968). See also Circuit Court Judge Edmund Lumbard, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1967, at 23, col. 3; New Jersey Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub, State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 279 A.2d 675 (1971).
6 See, e.g., Kings County, N.Y., District Attorney Aaron Koota:
[Court decisions have] contributed to the removal of an effective deterrent to crime,
namely, the certainty of swift discovery, apprehension and punishment. ...
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1966, at 1, col. 1. See also New York Police Commissioner Howard
Leary, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1967, at 1, col. 5; FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, N.Y.
Times, March 1, 1969, at 23, col. 2; Chicago Police Superintendent Orlando Wilson,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1966, at 35, col. I; Former New York County Prosecutor Richard
Kuh, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2; Former New York Police Commissioner
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Crime has always been news. The activists, however, increased
the amount and prominence of crime coverage. Each activist
speech or statement became a crime story. The controversy itself
was news. The activists have kept crime and judicial decisions
thereon in our newspapers and on our televisions throughout the
7
past decade.
Scholars have given credence to this barrage of criticism by
writing of judicial rulings as if they really did create obstacles
in the path of police efficiency, beyond those of the Constitution.8
The target of activist criticism has been the exclusionary rule.
The opposition started with McNabb v. United States 9 and
Mallory v. United States, 0 mounted with Mapp v. Ohio," and
reached a magnificently publicized crescendo after Miranda v.
Arizona; 12 Berger v. New York,' a United States v. Wade,14 and
Gideon v. Wainwright 15 added to the breadth of the opposition.
These decisions all attempt to control police activity that violates
stated constitutional rights. The enforcement activists perceive
these decisions as restraints on effective police activity, even when
the restricted activity is admittedly unconstitutional.
While the criticized judicial attempt to curb unconstitutional
police behavior has been, at best, minimally effective, the law enforcement activists' attempt to blame the courts for the increase
Vincent Broderick, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 20, 1966, at 48, 51; Executive
Director of International Association of Chiefs of Police Quinn Tamm, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, March 27, 1967, at 44, 45. For a broad selection of early activist statements and the development of the activist movement, see generally Kamisar, On the
Tactics of Police-ProsecutionOriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L. REV. 436
(1964).
7 Crime, of course, has always been news. However, the above quoted pronouncements and their like-and these are but the tip of the iceberg-caused additional stories, and additional coverage. They created a controversy- that made the reporting
necessary. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 6, at 441-42, where he gives examples of how
police press releases blaming crime on court decisions received first page coverage.
8 See, e.g., Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,
25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449 (1969); Inbau, supra note 1; Waite, Why Do Our Courts Protect
Criminals, AMERICAN MERCURY, Jan. 1956, at 55, 60.
9 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (prohibits use of evidence obtained during prolonged prearraignment detention).
10 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (prolonged pre-arraignment detention held violation of FED.
R. CiuM. P. 5(a)).
11 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applied the exclusionary rule to illegally seized evidence in
state litigation).
12 884 U.S. 436 (1966) (defined and excluded confessions made without constitutionally required warning of rights).
is388 U.S. 41 (1967) (restricted wiretapping).
14 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (required counsel's presence at lineups).
:5 372 US. 335 (1963) (required States to provide counsel for indigents).
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in crime has been effective. 6 A fascinating sidelight on the activist
anti-due process, anti-court campaign is that in its criticism of
judicial rulings, the campaign has added to the atmosphere of
lawlessness that has given the potential criminal security and reinforced him in his criminal intent. The campaign has had this
effect by eroding the credibility of the criminal law's threat of
sanction. It has helped to undermine confidence in law enforcement effectiveness, by proclaiming to all who would listen that
the police have been rendered impotent.
The irony in the situation appears when we note that the factual
allegations of those attacking judicial decisions as criminal stimulators are false. The judicial due process rulings have not caused,
incited, or abetted the commission of crime. In fact, they have
not even been successful in preventing the violative police conduct
that engendered them.17 The impotence of these court rulings has
long been known. Studies and legal writings have repeatedly
shown it.-s Yet, despite the proven ineffectiveness of the rulings,
the enforcement activists continue to tie judicial decisions to the
increase in the nation's crime problems.ls
The sole truth in activist commentary is that the exclusionary
rule does lead to the freeing of some factually guilty defendants in
an attempt to force changes in police practices. Opposition to
this process, on this, or moral grounds, is certainly reasonable.
However, in the exuberance of their opposition to due process
rulings, the activists have transformed legitimate criticism into
irresponsible proselytizing. 2° The activists attempt to arouse an
16F. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTrD WOUND 8 (1970) and Harris, Changing Public
Attitudes Toward Crime and Corrections, FED. PROB., March 1968, at 9, both show
that 63 percent of those polled felt that the courts were too lenient on crime and 77
percent felt that law and order had broken down.
17 See, e.g., F. GRAHAM, supra note 16, at 241-42.
1sF. GRAHAM, supra note 16; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 665 (1970). Former Attorney General Katzenbach called
the thought that the Court's rulings have caused a crime increase "unutterable nonsense." Harris, Reflections, THE NEW YORKER, March 25, 1972, at 44, 59.
19 Particularly vivid examples are detailed by Professor Kamisar, supra note 6. He
tells of Chicago Police Superintendent Orlando Wilson following his department's
announcement of a reduction in crime in Chicago in 1963 with statements that court
rulings had accounted for the increase in crime in Chicago. Id. at 458-60. In another
example, District of Columbia Police Chief Robert Murray blasted the Mallory decision for lowering his forces's efficiency when its efficiency had actually risen in the two
years following Mallory. Id. at 466-67.
20 See, e.g., Former N.Y. County Prosecutor Richard Kuh's desire for a "great dialogue" to stimulate a grass roots movement to reverse the Supreme Court's confession
rulings. N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2. See also note 1 supra.
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anti-judicial public outcry necessarily centered upon creating a
connection in the public's mind between the crime problem and
judicial due process decisions. The vehicle by which the elision
was to be made was the loss of police efficiency. Thus, central to
the activist presentation-discernible in every speech and article
-is the allegation that the courts have curbed the efficiency of
the police, giving the criminal an advantage, and thereby inciting
him to commit crime.
This article will show the error in each of those allegations.
First, the crime problem is not related to any loss in police
efficiency. The crime problem is the increase in crime. The police
loss of efficiency is not attributable to judicial decisions and has
not abetted the increase of crime. Second, the process by which
the criminal law operates to deter crime precludes influence by
judicial due process rulings. Being dependent on the news media,
however, this process is particularly susceptible to actions influencing its media image. Third, the activist campaign has eroded
public confidence in law enforcement, thereby abetting the disintegrative forces that cause crime. The side effect of a successful
anti-due process media campaign is the reinforcement of criminals.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CRIME PROBLEM

Implicit in the "law and order" rhetoric is the assumption that
the crime problem is caused by the coddling of criminals. The
police are prevented from arresting. The courts are revolving
doors-that is, sentences are too short. This analysis of the crime
problem is inaccurate. The problem is the number of crimes
committed and the high rate of increase. In light of this vast crime
commission quandary, the comparative ability of law enforcers to
search, seize or arrest before or after the Warren Court rulings
is of no significant consequence.
A. Police Efficiency and Crime
In 1970 over 5,500,000 crimes were reported. 21 The actual

number of crimes is much higher since many are not reported.
This known crime figure represents an increase of 176 percent
from 1960 levels. Major crimes against property rose 179 percent,
while major crimes against persons rose 156 percent.22 Meanwhile,
21

J.

EDGAR

HoovER,

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:

at 65 [hereinafter cited as
22 Id.

UNIFORM CRIME

UNIFORM

REPORTS].

CRIME

REPoRTs-1970,
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police efficiency slumped. Efficiency, as defined by the percentage
of known crimes cleared by an arrest, dropped from 26.7 percent
in 1960 to 20 percent in 1970.23 This total figure has given rise
to the misguided criticism of the courts. The assumption is that
efficiency declined because the police were precluded from arresting and searching as they once did.2 4 The inference upon the
assumption is that the previously arrested, now free criminals,
plus those new criminals motivated to crime by the shackled constabulary's judicially created impotence, are committing the additional crimes. The suggested remedy: expand the State's police
powers, and reduce the enforcement of due process protections.
The assumption and inference collapse when the crime data
are analyzed. Loss of efficiency in no substantial way relates to
court decisions.
Of course, in analyzing trends in police efficiency we tread in
a world of dreams.. The police have never been efficient. After a
decade long increase in efficiency-up 58 percent from 1950-city
police were able to apprehend fewer than 27 percent of those committing crimes.25 In 1960 the clearance rate was only 26.7 percent.26 The loss of efficiency since 1960 is the apprehension of 25

percent fewer criminals but this is only 6.7 fewer out of each
100 crimes reported. Since 73 percent, or more, criminals went
unapprehended in the calendar year before the Warren Court
could possibly have affected the States' police, the reader will
immediately perceive how hard it is to give much significance to
a loss of "efficiency."

23 Id. at 33. In the 1970 Uniform Crime Reports, the FBI claims that the 1960 police
efficiency was 31 percent. Id. In the 1960 Uniform Crime Reports there is no such
claim. The only data shows a 26.1 percent clearance rate for 2351 cities. UNIFORM
CRIME REPoRTs-1960, at 85-85. An analysis of the years following 1960 shows a claim
in 1961 that efficiency rose 2 percent, UNIFORM CRIME REPOR-s-1961, at 13, and a
claim in 1962 that the 1961 efficiency was 26.7 percent. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1962,
at 17. Thus, the 1960 efficiency should be slightly below 26.7 percent.
24 Some of those old-time 'methods have been immortalized in film. See Casablanca,
where police chief Claude Rains solves crimes by instructing his men: "Round up the
usual number of suspects."
25 UNIFORM CRIME REs'oRTs-1959, at 10, 81.
26 Herein, only reported crimes are considered. However, at least one-half of the
crimes actually committed are not reported. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 16, at 77;

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTiCE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 96-100 (1968); McClellan, The Role of the Bar
and the Judiciary, 7 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 67, 68 (1969). Thus, police efficiency never ex-

ceeded 15 percent at the FBI's 1960 claim.
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In fact, if police efficiency were at 1960 levels, only 7 percent
more reported crimes would be cleared. Of the 5,568,200 reported
crimes in 1970, 1960 police efficiency would leave 4,114,900 27 of
their perpetrators on the streets. The reversal of every Warren
Court decision, and the return to the police of every 1960 power,
would leave this society with over four million unsolved crimes.
That would be an enormous crime problem. But it is this drop
in efficiency, and only this drop, that can possibly be blamed on
the courts. Those decisions are the ones which lead judges, politicians, and scholars to inundate the public with orations of doom.
There are many reasons for the loss of efficiency. The major
cause is police work loads. Funds, energy, and thought have not
gone toward more police. While the number of violations increased 176 percent, the number of police employees per 1,000
inhabitants rose only 20 percent. If we focus on cities over
250,000-the site of the highest crime rates-there is but a 30
percent increase in manpower. 28 The police would have had to

more than double their per man arrest rate just to keep up. That
the police have increased the number of arrests by 87 percent 29 is astounding in light of the above shortage of manpower.
Though impressive in sustaining itself despite manpower shortages, police effectiveness varies, and always has varied, with the
nature of the crime. The more clues, the better the clearance
rate.30 It is society's misfortune that the crime commission explosion has been in those areas least amenable to solution.
[Dlue to the great volume of burglaries, larcenies and auto thefts,
a number of which are of a less serious nature since property of
little value was stolen or the vehicle was recovered within a few
hours, detection of the offender becomes more difficult due to the
absence of witnesses and lack of identification of property stolen. 8
27 This figure was deduced by taking the total crimes reported for 1970, UNIFORM
CRIME REsoRTs-1970, at 65, and then using the 1960 efficiency figure from the 1960
report (26.1 percent), UNIFORM CRIME RE.PoRTs-1960, at 85, there would still be 3.9
million unsolved crimes. Using the recently revealed 1960 claim of 31 percent,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1970, at 33, there would still be 3.9 million unsolved
crimes.
25 See UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs-1970, at 162; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1960, at 105.
29 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT--1970, at 33.
so It is interesting to note that, despite Mapp, the clearance rates for crimes against

persons remained constant from 1960 through 1965. See
note 26, at 106.
81 UNIFORM CRIME RuoRTs-1960, at 12.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,

supra
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Of the 3.5 million major crimes committed in 1970 over the 1960

2
level, 3.1 million were larcenies, burglaries, and auto thefts.
These are crimes leaving few clues. If the thief escapes from the
scene of the crime unapprehended, he is gone. No reversal of
Mapp., Gideon, Miranda, Wade, etc., would permit his capture.
If criminals committed crimes that were easier to solve, the police
would be more effective. It is assumed that even the activists
perceive the courts' inability to remedy this situation.
A city by city analysis of the problem indicates that the skill
of the local constabulary, rather than the due process rulings
of the courts, controls the numbers and success of motions to
suppress evidence. In Cincinnati, Ohio, for instance, an exhaustive
12 year data compilation shows no effect on the police's ability
to arrest and convict in the narcotic, gambling, and weapons
areas.83
There are alternative police responses to due process rulings
other than compliance. Pursuant to any of the alternatives, the
police can clear crimes by arrest as freely as their skill allows. The
first alternative is to continue to search, arrest, and confiscate
without concern for judicial rules. The courts rule, but police
clearance is not affected. In Chicago, for instance, an inordinately
high number of suppression motions are made and granted in
gambling cases.34 The reason is obvious: the Chicago police do not
seriously intend to observe the search and seizure laws. 3 ' The
second alternative is to continue unabated the violative enforcement practices, while recognizing judicial authority in the courtroom by abating the accuracy of testimony about those practices.
A New York City study revealed this hopefully novel method of
preventing judicial due process decisions from having any effect
on police practice. The study showed that "[p]olice practices in
New York City narcotics enforcement . . . have not changed
substantially as a result of Mapp." 36 Their testimony, however,
has changed. The various studies showed that the major change
in police practice after Mapp was the development of sophisticated perjury on suppression-related issues 37 and/or perfunctory

82 See UNIFORM CRIME REFPoRTS-1970,

at 65.

33 Oaks, supra note, 18, at 707.

84 Id. at 684-85.
35Id.
SONote, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Research-and-Seizure Practice in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 103 (1968).
87 Oaks, supra note 18, at 699,708, 739-40.
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compliance techniques, so that their actions will pass judicial
inspection without having complied with the spirit of the judicial
rule. An obvious example is the manner of compliance with the
Miranda warning provisions. The warnings were to insure that a
defendant understood his rights before waiving them. Perfunctory
compliance involves a statement of rights immediately followed
8
by the interrogation
By many paths the same end has been reached. The potentially
restrictive effects of due process rulings have been avoided. The
police have shown the capacity to arrest those suspected of
criminal depredations without having been significantly impeded
by the judicial concern for due process. If the activist characterization of law enforcement as impotent is to have any foundation,
it must be revealed in the litigation process following apprehension.
B. Prosecutor Efficiency and Due Process Rulings
A reader might urge that even if the reduction in police
efficiency is not attributable to court rulings, there must have been
a concurrent lowering in the conviction rate, and the rate of those
arrested who are charged, and that this destruction of our crime
control capabilities in court served as an inducement to the
criminal. Nothing could be less true. All of the Court's rulings
have done nothing to erode the ability of our country's prosecutors to convict charged defendants. 3 9 Of major felonies, the 1970
conviction rate-convicted of the crime charged or a lesser
degree thereof-was 71 percent overall.4 0 In 1960 the total conviction rate for these crimes was not given, but all these crimes
were listed separately. Of those listed only the larceny figure
exceeds 71 percent. It is 72 percent. The average is below 70
88 See e.g., F. GRAHAM, supra note 16, at 276-78.
89 The total rate of convictions per crimes reported is, of course, lower in 1970. This

reduction has been caused by the drop of 6.7 points in the rate of apprehension. See
note 23 supra.The increase in the rate of those arrested who are convicted is dependent upon too many factors for casual explanation. It is not unlikely, however, that one
of those factors is the increased prosecutorial skill engendered by the necessity of
complying with sophisticated judicially enforced regulations on the presentation of
evidence.
40 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1970, at 36. The law activist allegation of Mr. Nixon
during the 1968 campaign ("If the conviction rate were doubled in this country, it
would do more to eliminate crime...." Harris, supra note 18, at 44.) is truly incredible
in light of the known conviction rate.
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The prosecutor has been anything but prevented from indicting
those apprehended. If those due process rules have had an impact
on his ability to make cases they have worked to increase the
percent of those arrested who are eventually charged with crimes
4
from 76 percent in 1960 to 84 percent in 1970. 3

C. Suppression Motions and Serious Crimes

The FBI's major felonies, herein used as the basis for the
statistical material discussed, include those crimes most directly
affecting the minds of the public. Fear of crimes of violencestreet muggings, rapes, and robberies-rather than of property
crimes, is central to the public's apprehension for its personal
safety. 44 Search and seizure problems, however, tend to surface

most frequently in other crime areas. In one substantial study
of suppression motions in Chicago, it was shown that over 75
percent of suppression motions were made in gambling, narcotics,
and weapons cases.4 5 Persons held on these charges represent
about 3 percent of the total number of persons held for trial on
criminal charges in this country. 4 Even if an incredibly high
50 percent of this 3 percent were released because of successful
suppression motions, they could not be held responsible for a
significant number of the 5.5 million reported crimes. Further,
gambling cases are overwhelmingly trivial in nature-usually the
case is a charge of possession of a few betting slips by a runner,
41 This figure is hard to discern from the Uniform Crime Reports. However, the
1960 average of 76.3 percent, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1960, at 86, includes traffic and
public intoxication offenders having conviction rates near 80 percent, and is thus
inflated.
42 Robbery: 58.7 to 60.6 percent burglary: 67.4 to 71.1 percent; grand larceny:
72.0 to 77.3 percent. UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs-1960, at 86; see UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS-1970, at 114. The 1970 figures do not include those persons referred
to juvenile court.
43

44

See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1970, at 115; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1960, at 85.
See McIntyre, Public Attitudes Towards Crime and Law Enforcement, 6 AM.

CRIM. L.Q. 66, 71 (1968).
45 Oaks, supra note 18, at 682. It is interesting to note that the entire drug and
gambling areas are considered by many to be outside the effective range of the criminal sanction. Gambling, it is suggested, should not be criminal at all, while drug possession and addiction should be treated medically.
4" Oaks, supra note 18, at 681.

CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

or dice and paraphernalia by those engaged in a street "craps"
game-as are most narcotic arrests-usually involving the possession of a small amount of marihuana, pills, cocaine, or heroin.
Narcotic arrests involving significant sellers, or quantities of
goods, are most often made by undercover agents who arrange for
a direct purchase of the drugs. These cases are virtually immune
from a successful suppression motion by the nature of the investigation. Substantial numbers of these motions are made in nonaddictive drug cases, and substantial numbers are denied. Motions
made in concealed weapons cases, whether granted or not, in
no way affect the commission of violent crimes. The gun is not
returned, even if the motion is granted.
Thus, the impact of those suppression motions made is minimal.
Of arrested criminals, 3 percent generate 75 percent of the suppression motions. Of these cases, a large percentage are trivial,
the contraband is withdrawn from criminal hands, and, of course,
the motions are always more frequently denied than granted.
In conclusion, the reduction in police efficiency from 1960 to
1970 (a) is insubstantial as a causative factor in the increase of
crime, in light of the enormous number of crimes that would
remain unsolved even if 1960 efficiency had been maintained,
(b) is explained substantially by society's failure to pay for adequate law enforcement manpower, and (c) is not attributable to
court due process decisions. This last point is explained by a number of factors. First, the rise in criminal activity has been centered
in property crimes which have a traditionally low clearance rate
and in which criminals leave few clues. Furthermore, the rate of
arrestees charged by the prosecutor has increased, and the in
court efficiency rate-percent convicted-has risen. Also, the
crimes engendering most suppression motions represent a minimal
percentage of the total number of arrests. Finally, the police have
shown the ability to adjust their methods to judicial decisions
with no discernible efficiency loss.
II.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

The above demonstrated barrier between court decisions restricting police activity and the commission rate can be understood when the impact of court decisions is analyzed in the perspective of our criminal law system and the role of the law enforcement bureaucracy therein.
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A. The Criminal Law Process
The entire criminal law system has one major justificationthe maintenance of social order. 4 7 The law fosters order by defining aberrant behavior. It then operates to deter aberrant behavior
in two ways. The first deterrent is the self-imposed control that
the vast majority of citizens place upon themselves by internalizing the law's definition of right and wrong, so that it is their
own.' 8 The second deterrent is the direct threat of a sanction.
It divides into two major categories: (a) the threat of public
stigma 49 (losing a job, being branded an outcast) and (b) the
threat of punishment (jail, fine).
Our legal system is necessarily premised upon the .theory of
individual compliance with law. The system succeeds only when it
prevents crimes from being committed. It does this through the
law's being created as an accurate representation of the consensus
norms.8 0 It can influence those norms slightly by fostering an
easily recognizable set of values that can be followed. The
criminal act is abhorrent to the personal values of the citizenry,
while becoming a criminal is unthinkable. But the world has few
perfect citizens. The law recognizes this and perpetuates a threat
of sanction (a) to encourage the formation of complying behavior
patterns and (b) actively to deter those who are tempted. 51-'.
The sanction threat cannot deter crime if it is not credible.
A citizen not adequately controlled by the internalized values
will not conform his conduct out of fear of punishment, if he
has no reason to believe that punishment is likely-if he feels he
will not be caught. The law enforcement bureaucracy exists as the
47 See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW 8CCONTEMP. PROB. 401, 402
(1958).
48 The promulgation of law and its putative enforcement foster conforming behavior, which, in being constantly repeated, creates complying behavior patterns.
These patterns insure compliance with the law. See generally E. DURKHEIM, THE DiVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1947), H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-100 (1961);
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 42 (1968); P. TAPPAN, CRIME,
JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 247 (1960).
49 See H. PACKER, supra note 48, at 45.

50 See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 19-20 (1967). These
norms are initially assumed by internalizing the values transmitted through the normal channels of communication-parents, school, peers-to the child.
51 Loss in utility from punishment is a major negative factor in the criminal's computation. See Birmingham, A Model of the CriminalProcess: Game Theory and Law,
56 CORNELL L. REV. 57 (1970).
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visible agent of coercion. Its job is only secondarily to arrest, convict, sentence and rehabilitate. (Note how poorly these functions
are performed).52 More important, its very existence gives meaning to the law's threat of sanction.
The activity of this law enforcement bureaucracy obviously has
no impact on the successful operation of the first deterrent made.
The degree to which the citizenry internalizes the law's norms as
its own is beyond the control of judicial decision. The law at
inception is the product of a legislative body. Neither the courts
nor the police create criminal statutes. If that law varies greatly
from the norms of a large segment of the society, its rule does
not reflect the consensus norm and people will violate it, as during
prohibition. If the values of a large segment of society have
changed since the promulgation of the law, and it no longer
represents the consensus norm, it will be violated, as is the case
with possession and use of marihuana. The courts do not create
the norms in society by due process rulings. The effectiveness of
the first method of deterrence is purely a matter of legislative
skill in keeping the laws a reflection of the beliefs of the public. 53
Fear of stigma is a major element in the law's threat of sanction.
That, too, is beyond the impact of the law bureaucracy. No matter
how great the public feeling of law's effectiveness-or the real
effectiveness of law-fear of being stigmatized by the mark of
criminality will not curb criminal acts if society has a substantial
number of deviant sub-groups. In our society, drug addicts, some
militant radicals, professional criminals, juvenile gangs, etc., are
among the deviant sub-groups. To the dominant society, subgroup membership itself is stigmatizing. Within the sub-group,
52 Some of these functions were unknown to the law until recently. The entire concept of rehabilitation of the criminal is only a century old. Individualized sentencing
is even more recent. The bureaucracy has had little experience with anything but
deterrence-oriented punitive criminal treatment. See Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?,
55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 332, 337 (1964).
53 The legislative failure to pass laws reflecting social norms, and, of great importance, to amend laws so that they change to reflect the existing norms, has abetted
much of the crime problem. The criminal sanction as applied to homosexuality,
prophylactics, abortion, marihuana, and even heroin, no longer reflects the values of
significant segments of the community. The problem of keeping the law in touch with
the ever-changing, constantly diversifying society, challenges the continuation of
democratically enforced laws. If the diffusion is so great that there is no consensus,
laws will only be enforceable by repression. Cf. 0. HOLMES, TuE COMMON LAW 41
(1881); N. WALKER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SocIETY 31 (1971). The limit of law's
effectiveness is that it cannot dominate norms. It can only influence. In periods of
social unrest, law lags too far behind the norms, and disorder follows.
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compliance with law, not violation, brings stigma. Being arrested
is a mark of distinction or, at least, so ordinary as to be valueless.
The courts have no practical control over the growth of such subgroups. Even if the public statements blaming police efficiency
loss on the courts were true, there is no causative link to the forces
that impel people to leave the main stream of society for a subgroup.5 4 Nor could an increase of 6.7 points in the number of
unapprehended criminals be considered a significant cause of the
55
breakdown in the nation's moral fibre.
The threat of sanction is the vital second mode of our criminal
law system's effective operation. 5 6 Assuming, as the system does,
that those undeterred by internalized values act rationally most
of the time, the threat of being caught and punished will outweigh the temptation to sin. The fear of sanction is basically the
fear of being apprehended, caught, exposed. Few, if any, tempted
citizens think about their chances of being acquitted, rather than
convicted, once caught. Their security comes from a supposed
57
immunity from capture.
Whether the punishment is the social punishment of peer
ostracism-loss of job, credit card, or club membership--or the
physical punishment of incarceration, it will only deter action
when perceived as realistic. 58 The public perception of the reality
of the threat, not the actual reality, is the operating factor in a
democracy. 59 The reality of law enforcement has always been such
54 An example is the substantial youth gang problems during the presumably law
enforcement oriented 1950's. Narcotics, not law, are credited with their dispersal.
55 That fibre, in its cohesive form, is credited with restraining those tending towards
sub-group membership.
56 See generally Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 949 (1966). See also A. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICr AND THE LAW 77 (1965).
57 Two exceptions are the organized criminal and the financial criminal. Activist
criticisms of judicial sentencing leniency as creating a revolving door effect, similarly
reinforce the criminal's belief that crime pays. It projects an image of law enforcement ineffectiveness. That image can only encourage the criminal.
Of course, the convicted felon knows something of law enforcement efficiency and
the likelihood of being convicted after arrest. However, his personal experience-hav-,
ing been convicted-would tend to increase his belief in post arrest enforcement efficiency. If he returns to crime (i.e., becomes a recidivist), he clearly must take that
path upon the belief that he will avoid apprehension.
58 Andenaes, supra note 56. Cf. Watson, A Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime
and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 611, 612-13 (1958).
59 In a democracy, incarceration comes because of the commission of an act defined
publicly as evil, but only after proof has been assembled. The fear of punishment
cannot encompass the belief that every crime will be punished. Thus, no substantially
deviant sub-group could be controlled by fear. That the risk is substantial is all the
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that a knowledgeable criminal would never have been deterred.
Even before being hindered by Warren Court rulings, the police's
highest efficiency claim for 1960 was only 31 percent. That gives
the criminal a 2 to 1 chance of success.
If the odds were always in favor of the criminal, how is fear
of sanction effective? It is in part effective, because even odds
are not enough to make the risk worthwhile for one with
middle class values, with a social position to lose. 60 It is
primarily effective because the public is not aware of the traditional incompetence of the police element of the law enforcement
bureaucracy.6 1 The public's ignorance is essential to its compliance pursuant to the second-not first-mode of deterrence.
Knowledge of the law bureaucracy's inefficiency would reinforce
criminal desires.
B. The Law Enforcement Bureaucracy
The aim of the system is to prevent crime. The basic reason for
the existence of the law enforcement bureaucracy is simply to
reinforce the deterrent effect of the law's threat of sanction. Thus,
every criminal act is a failure of the system.
Each crime represents the non-verbal pronouncement of a
member of society who states his rejection of the normative
definition of the law and his contempt for the threat of sanction.6 2
Since the crime is a failure in the system, the operation of the law
enforcement bureaucracy-as distinguished from its very existence
-is remedial. The apprehended criminal is charged, convicted,
and sentenced to re-establish the aura of legitimacy around the
threat of sanction.
Sentencing jargon most clearly reveals this purpose. The talk
is more of figurative deterrence, general and specific,6 3 than of refear that a non-police state can engender. In a totalitarian regime, a terror is created.
The thought of law's violation is sufficient basis for arrest and elimination. Objective
proof of an act is unnecessary. The fear such enforcement creates is sufficient to control the tolerated sub-groups. Cf. Gerber and McAnany, Punishment: Current Survey
of Philosophy and Law, 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 491, 527-28 (1967).
60 Voremberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
1972, at 63, 69.
81 See N. WALKER, supra note 53, at 66.
62 See Andenaes, supra note 56, at 959-60.
63 F. ALEXANDER AND H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 19 (1956);
Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 226, 229 (1959); Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment"--Elaboratingthe.
Process of Decision in SanctioningSystems of the CriminalLaw, 44 DEN. L.J. 163, 199
(1967). See also Cincinnati Enquirer, Dec. 20, 1970, at I lA, col. 1.
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habilitation. Such "deterrence" is the patch sewn by the law
bureaucracy to cover the public's perception of the citizencriminal successfully flouting the norms. General deterrence is
the effect the punishment of one out of every four criminals
(26.7 percent efficiency rate in 1960) is supposed to have on other
potential criminals-reinforcement of the reality of sanction.
Specific deterrence is the attempt to deal with the individual
violator by treating, punishing, or detaining him so that he will
sin no more. The bureaucracy's deterrent acts are restricted to apprehended criminal defendants. If others are affected it is.by
example only.
This remedial nature of the enforcement bureaucracy's function
insulates it from the general populace. Only those involved in the
process know anything about it-defendants, witnesses, jurors, and
the technicians. Everyone else relies, in part, on word of. mouth
and. primarily on the news media.6 ' General deterrence, for example, would be meaningless if nobody absent from the courtroom knew that the defendant was sentenced. It would be just
as trivial if nobody but those in court knew that the perpetrator
had been apprehended. Dissemination of enforcement successes is
crucial to the success of the enforcement bureaucracy's remedial
efforts. Favorable publicity more than the facts themselves creates
the feeling of reality in the threat of sanction. The public does
not know whether crimes are committed, who commits them,
whether they are arrested or sentenced, or whether crime pays,
except through the media.
Yet scholarly commentary all too often assumes this transmission 65 and assumes that the transmission is both instantaneous and
accurate enough to draw mathematical models of the system,
without reference to the possibility of no communication, or misinformation. 6
The analysts err in this by overlooking the remedial nature of
the law bureaucracy, the media revolution, and the limits of
human perception.
64 See K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 10-12 (1966); N. WAUER, supra note 53, at
65; McIntyre, supra note 44, at 70.
65 The decisions of the courts and actions by the police and prison officials transmit
knowledge about the law, underlining the fact that criminal laws are not mere
empty threats, and providing detailed information as to what kind of penalty might
be expected ...
Andenaes, supra note 56, at 949.
66 See, e.g., Birmingham, supra note 51.
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C. The Source of Confusion

The judicial system is part of the enforcement bureaucracy that
functions inconsistently with the deterrence function of the total
structure.
The purpose of the entity is to make real the law's threat of
punishment. Police, prosecutors, judges, and social workers all
work toward that end. However, the role of the courts is double.
One function of the court, through the judge, is to render
sentence upon the violator. The other inconsistent function is to
determine guilt through the trial.
This multiplicity of function, inadequately appreciated, has
led some judges to decry judicial attempts to enforce recognized
constitutional protections, 6 7 and analysts to criticize the system's
inefficiency.8 It explains the dominant prosecution orientation
of the judiciary.o

Judges are too often overwhelmed by their importance within
the law enforcement bureaucracy. Theirs is the vital role of
effectuating deterrence through the sentence, a role, actually
perceived, in terms of deterrence. Courts are often heard to
render lengthy sentences with reference to the need for the setting
of an example or the overriding importance of the court's duty
to protect society-overriding the defendant's meritorious claim
for probation. The judge thinks of himself as an agent of law
enforcement, a part of society's attempt to deter crime.
This attitude, created by the sentencing function, is then
carried over into the guilt determining function. In evidentiary
rulings, from minor grants of latitude to prosecutors to proprosecution credibility findings on suppression motions, this
attitude is revealed. However, the charge is the major vehicle by
which a deterrence oriented judge influences the fact-finding
process. He summarizes the evidence so as to enhance the prosecution's case and denigrate the defense. He notifies the jury of his
67 See note 5 supra.

68 See Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedure Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723,
728 (1942). See also W. SEAGLE, LAW: THE SCIENCE INEFFICIENCY (1952).
69 New York senior Legal Aid trial counsel Jack Lipson's experience has led him
to say, "With rare exception, judges I have encountered are prosecution oriented."

See also Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 792 (1970); Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972). My own experience as a criminal defense counsel leads to the
identical conclusion.
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belief that the defendant is guilty. 70 He thinks of himself as one
who can, and should, use his position to insure that the 'guilty
are sentenced. He represents the law enforcement bureaucracy,
then, rather than the law.
In this identification the judges lose touch with the major purpose, and reason, for their existence. The Anglo-American institution of the adversarial trial, with a theoretically impartial judge,
exists to protect the liberties of the citizen-defendant. 71 It is an
internal balance of the law upon the operation of the enforcement
bureaucracy.
The State has but limited powers in our democratic system.
Before one can become fodder for general deterrence, he must be
shown to have done something deserving of punishment. 72 General
deterrence would be far more effective if each person arrested received some punishment. Fear would be universal. The very
sight of a policeman would bring terror, for he would have the
power just by arresting to deprive one of liberty. That, although
seemingly desired by the law activist, is not a democratic system
of law enforcement. Despite the law and order value that places
deterrence by conviction above all other values, fairness and
justice must be protected, or democracy will not exist.
Limits upon the State's power, such as those embodied in the
Bill of Rights, are reasonable. A moment of reflection before
punishing, is more than a mere sop to democracy. It is a necessary
check on the actions of the police. The necessity of this balancing
function is rejected by the activist. Supported by some scholars,13
the activist's model of a properly administered society includes an
unfettered police force. To him the presumption of innocence
makes no sense as far as factual guilt is concerned. His model
rejects any systematic control upon the police force, despite the
fact that presently 20 percent of all adults arrested are never
A typical example is:
The prosecution has shown that the defendant had in his hand a paper bag containing 13 stolen letters. The prosecution has shown that these letters were stolen.
Officer X testified that he saw the defendant put these letters into the bag. On the
other hand, the defendant denies....
7' See Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in Y. KAMISAR,
F. INBAU, AND T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTnCE IN OUR TIME 137 (1965).
72 See Gerber and McAnany, supra note 59, at 527-28.
70

78 See

H.

PACKER, supra note

48, at 149-73.
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prosecuted and 29 percent of those prosecuted are not guilty of
any crime.7'
That is not a satisfactory efficiency rate. Without the trial
stage, or at least the threat thereof, those people might have
been punished; they were already stigmatized by arrest, bail, and
a criminal record. In no other area of enterprise would such a
rate of error be tolerated without a system of checks. In criminal
law, that check is the. trial. The present law enforcement arrest
system is so faulty that it cannot be relied upon to insure fairness
either to the individual arrested or to those others depending on
the system to maintain a just order. Without the judiciary performing its role in enforcing substantive and procedural due
process by means of the trial, the law bureaucracy would be totally
uncontrolled. The judiciary that opposes strong due process rules,
on grounds other than ineffectiveness or immorality, has been
co-opted by the enforcement bureaucracy at the expense of its
major role as regulator of that bureaucracy.
The judicial regulatory process causes the release of some
factually guilty defendants. It always has. Suppression of illegally
seized evidence, rejection of hearsay, determinations of guilt upon
nothing less that proof beyond a reasonable doubt,7'5 etc., equally,
permit the escape of the guilty. But the number released is
insignificant. They are far too few to affect the crime rate. If
reported accurately, the media coverage of their release would
not erode the credibility of the threat of sanction.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE ENFORCEMENT AcrIVIsTs
The dependency of the law's threat of sanction upon the dissemination of information about the law bureaucracy's actions,
leaves it susceptible to the enforcement activist. His castigations
of judicial decisions as preventing adequate police protection
for the citizen, and his exploitation and publication of criminal
acts, 7 6 have affected the nature of the information disseminated.
74 UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs-1970, at 36. There is, of course, some circularity here.
A part of those cases dismissed were dismissed because of problems with illegal
searches. There is no doubt that many of those brought to trial are acquitted because
the jury has not found proof of their factual guilt, while many of those arrested are
mistakenly identified at that stage. See generally J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GuILTY
(1957).
75See, e.g., Nolan v. State, 213 Md. 298, 131 A.2d 851 (1957).
78 The following was part of Mr. Nixon's 1968 campaign rhetoric:
A cab driver has been brutally murdered. ... An old woman had been murdered
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He has, in combination with the nation's social unrest, drawn
in the public mind the picture of a handcuffed policeman. The
activist's statements are promulgated so that media coverage will
be substantial.
The public position of its enunciator alone would be sufficient
to cause the reporting of his statements. The potential criminal is
part of the audience. The activist critic of the courts, thus, in some
ways actually encourages the criminal. Without the activistengendered reporting, the thief might not have formed so clear an
image. Without the image, he might never have gained enough
confidence to commit his crime.
The anti-Supreme Court section of the enforcement activist's
campaign against due process protections peaked with the 1968
presidential campaign. Starting in 1967, with the beginnings of
the campaign for the nomination, election speeches, given repeatedly, and reported constantly throughout the country,"7
charged the courts with having incited crime."" In 1967 there was
also persistent activist pressure focused against the Miranda decision,", by decrying its horrifying effect on the ability of the
police to make a sufficient case. This publicity effort merged
with the social unrest in the ghettos, and, against the Vietnamese
War. The crime rate accelerated from an 11 percent increase in
1966, to 16 percent in 1967.80 As Mr. Nixon toured the country
telling the television studio and newspaper audiences that the
Supreme Court had given, "the green light" to the "criminal
elements" in this country,8' as the nation convulsed in response
to the King and Kennedy assassinations, as the campaign drew
to a torrid close, the crime rate soared by 17 percent.82 No other
result was possible. The campaign had increased the percentage
of Americans believing that the courts were too lenient with
criminals to 63 percent and had caused 2 out of every 3 Americans
to feel that the restriction on police questioning of suspects was
and robbed brutally.... And an old man had been beaten and clubbed to death,
and the man who committed the crime was let off....
Wall St. Journal, Oct. 22, 1968, at 20, col. 4.
77 See F. GRAHAM, supra note 16, at 76; N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 31, col. 1.
78 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1968, at 33, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968, at 18, col. 3.
ToFor a partial list of Senators joining in the anti-Miranda rhetoric, see N.Y. Times,
March 8, 1967, at 28, col. 1. See also notes 2, 3, and 4 supra.
80 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1966, at 1; UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1967, at 1.
81 N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1968, at 18, col. 3.
82 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1968, at 1.
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a mistake.83 In combination with the visible unrest it caused-the
vast majority to feel that law and order had broken down. And
most importantly, it caused 75 percent to feel that the law enforcement system could no longer discourage people from committing crimes84

The activist propaganda succeeded. The majority of Americans had no confidence in their law enforcement system. The
criminals and the honest alike saw the impotence of law enforcement. The law was without a realistic threat of sanction. Simultaneously, the campaign had created a willingness in the public
mind to accept rules curtailing traditional freedoms. Perhaps unintentionally, the groundwork had been laid for the introduction
of restrictive laws to deal with the lawlessness problem, a problem
in some ways exacerbated by those desiring the restrictive laws.
After the presidential campaign, the rhetoric cooled. So did the
crime rate. With no change in the Warren Court's due process
rulings, with no addition of significant police enforcement powers,
the rate of crime's increase was only 12 percent in 1969,85 and 11
percent in 1970.86
The conjunction of sharp increases in the commission of crime
with the intense anti-Miranda,anti-due process, anti-Court, activist
campaign, is not accidental. The general increase of crime would
have occurred despite the decade long activist propagandizing.
The forces producing crime exist no matter what was said about
police efficiency or judicial rulings. Social turmoil over Vietnam
and racial problems would not have been quieted. The concerted
effort to use the media to formulate an image of judicial responsibility for crime, through emphasis on the ineffectiveness of the
police, for the purpose of stirring public opinion,87 however, must
accept its place among the disruptive factors. Without it, the crime
increase might have been just a bit less severe.
CONCLUSION

The activists seem near their goal. There is a new Supreme
Court, a Court staffed with known opponents of strong criminal
due process protections. If the anticipated amelioration of Warren
83F.

GRAHAM, supra note 16, at 8.
84 Harris, supra note 16, at 9.
85 UNIFORM CRIME

REPoRTs-1969, at 4.

86 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS-1970, at 5.
87 See note 20 supra.
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Court rulings S8-police liberation-occurs, it will do as little
to solve the crime problem as the Warren Court decisions did to
cause it. Police activity short of tyranny cannot touch the roots
of crime.8 9 Excess in the name of law and order, however, can
endanger liberty. Court rulings that denature due process protection could turn the trial process into a rubber stamp for
law enforcement activity, eliminating the only significant watchdog upon the law enforcers. Liberty would be lost with no gain
in order.

88 See, e.g., Gordon, A Quiet Revolution, JUSTICE, March/April 1972, at 12; N.Y.
Times, March 21, 1972, at I, col. 3.
89 Cf. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1972, at 14, col. 1.

